Predicting Pezeshkian’s Taliban Policy

By Anant Mishra and Christian Kaunert

On Tuesday, Masoud Pezeshkian sworn in as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 9^th President. As analysed during his presidential campaign, the authors opined his candidature to be much stronger than that of other candidates. This was all the more evident during the second phase of his campaigning when the focus drew on his policy towards the Taliban. His distinct views (from Jalili’s) divided the audience in the early second phase, influencing his supporters even more when the Taliban slid into the discussion from a meagre analogy. 

By the end of the second phase, many Iranians (especially from the Pezeshkian camp) had then considered Jalili sharing ideological similarities with that of the Taliban. That being so, during the author’s discussion with a political leader (who served in the previous Rouhani government and advised Pezeshkian on foreign relations during his campaign) during the second phase of the presidential race, he vowed to prevent a Taliban-aligned administrator from forming the government. His statement not only reflected Jalili’s approach to the Taliban (if he became the administrator) but also severe apprehensions towards Iranian national security under his leadership. The authors interpreted his statement in two ways: 

Firstly, from a purely reformist perspective (emanating from the Pezeshkian camp), Jalili as an administrator was considered too extreme (even radical, according to some scholars), putting him in the same group as the Taliban (with a desire to bring regional, perhaps even global instability). Though many in the Jalili camp disassociated these views, referring to them as meagre hearsay, some close to him (also those who voted for him) discreetly acknowledged his views as ‘somewhat’ extreme. 

Secondly, the statement above also reflected Jalili’s intent to support the Taliban, perhaps an intent to establish a functional relationship taking into account the Taliban’s twenty-one-year campaign against the West (primarily the US), disregarding the threat posed by the group to Iranian national security, its territorial integrity/sovereignty or to local Iranians directly. Taking this discussion to Jalili’s camp, the authors spoke in great detail with political leaders and closest aides who described the Pezeshkian government ‘to be worse than that of Rouhani, risking regional instability in the first few months.’ 

Keeping the aforementioned statements into account, the authors predict that the Pezeshkian administration will employ a different policy towards the Taliban government, differing from the late former President Rouhani’s approach to the group. Taking the nature of reformist governments, Pezeshkian’s administration may express little or no interest/inclination to support any radical/Islamic regime, particularly in the immediate neighborhood, even if the entity is raising its flag against the West/US or their allies. With the Taliban echoed during the presidential race, it is highly likely for Pezeshkian to limit direct engagement with the group, at least during the first few months of his presidency. Similar reluctance appears to persist inside the Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, according to a Kabul-based journalist who engages with the Taliban’s MFA frequently. He opined on serious confusion and probable discontent with the Pezeshkian victory. To confirm his observation, the authors interviewed two Taliban leaders inside the Rahbari Shura, who expressed hope for strengthening and expanding relations between the two neighbors during the Pezeshkian administration, reflecting ambiguity and silence on the Taliban’s reservation over Pezeshkian’s victory. With the Rahbari Shura known to have closely monitored the outcome with great enthusiasm, Pezeshkian’s stance towards the group may have called for some reproachment in its policy towards Iran, instigating profound dissatisfaction from a pragmatic neighbor with a possibility of even plunged ties with Tehran (during Pezeshkian’s presidency), reflecting severe mistrust weeks before his formal oath to power.

That said, President-elect Pezeshkian can choose to adopt a different policy towards the Taliban, provided that his choice of cabinet receives blessings from the Supreme Leader. His cabinet will undergo serious vetting by the Office of the Supreme Leader, to put it plainly by Ali Khamenei himself. To understand the influence of the Supreme Leader, the authors spoke to a Tehran-based political leader who worked closely with the Late President Rouhani. He opined of a similar practice carried out by the late president, who, on one occasion, discussed the nomination of one particular political leader for a cabinet appointment with him, seeking the green light from the Supreme Leader himself. The statement above does not provide any substantial evidence to support the practice of seeking a green light from the Supreme Leader for the President’s cabinet. Indeed, it highlights the importance of seeking the Supreme Leader’s approval for matters of the state. According to a Tehran-based expert, certain appointments explicitly call for a green light from the Office of the Supreme Leader. These appointments include: 

1. Minister/Public servants heading portfolios within domestic/foreign Intelligence service, 
2. Minister/Public servants heading portfolios within the Ministry of Defence, 
3. Minister/Public Servants heading portfolios within the Ministry of Interior, 
4. Minister/Public Servants heading portfolios within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Suppose the Pezeshkian administration decides to chart a course to re-establish a relationship with the West (it’s a big if); the bullwork would rest majorly on the cabinet member heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As a set precedent, the Supreme Leader has always nominated the post of the Foreign Minister to his preferred candidate, strengthening the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and synchronising the mandate of the MFA with that of the IRGC activities in the Middle East and beyond. As a principle, the foundation of Iran’s foreign policy can only be altered by the Supreme Leader, with IRGC providing strategic support to his decisions. According to one Tehran based political leader, the responsibility of charting Iran’s Foreign Policy now rests with former nuclear negotiator Abbas Araqchi, the new Iran’s foreign minister. Even if, as a hypothesis, the President and his cabinet decide to alter Iran’s foreign policy towards a positive direction (in the interests of the people), it will be forced to face the brunt of the IRGC.

As a powerful force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) can create serious hurdles for the Pezeshkian administration. It is a powerful force with a mandate of supporting ideologically/politically aligned Islamic groups/factions with a common goal of opposing the US and its allies. With IRGC’s growing engagement with the Taliban, particularly the GDI, it remains unclear how the Pezeshkian administration would put a check on the Guard Corp’s interaction with political leaders across the border. At this junction, it remains unclear if Pezeshkian’s administration could segregate strategic engagements from regional diplomacy with an intent to put a temporary stop to IRGC’s engagement with the Taliban.

Only by successfully navigating the hurdles above does the Pezeshkian administration stand a chance in altering Iran’s Taliban policy since the latter came to power in 2021. If not, the Pezeshkian administration could retain the late President Rouhani’s policy towards the Taliban, which the Office of the Supreme Leader could emphasise. That said, even if the Supreme leader does give the green light to an altered Taliban policy, expecting a substantial change would be hypothetical. It remains to be seen whether Pezeshkian will open doors of engagement based on realities in Tehran or Kabul or put forth the traditional stance of engaging with any Islamic group with hostilities against the US and its allies.

Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, Pontypridd.  

Christian Kaunert is a Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland and University of South Wales, Pontypridd.

Note: The contents of the article are of sole responsibility of the author. Afghan Diaspora Network will not be responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in the articles.