Pakistan’s Military Equipment Performance Under Fire: Operation Sindoor 2025
By Vishnu Nair
India’s Operation Sindoor was the clearest example of how Pakistan’s defence systems fell below expectations and confidence when they were tested against integrated air defence, electronic warfare, standoff strikes, and real-time targeting.
Pakistan entered the crisis with a heavy military ecosystem, including HQ-9/HQ-16-type air defence, JF-17s, J-10Cs, PL-15 missiles, radars, drones, and command networks. Yet once India shifted from the initial counter-terror strikes to retaliation against Pakistani military infrastructure, the hyped shield did not prevent Indian forces from striking air defence sites, radars, and airbases inside Pakistan. The second example is the Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela in January 2026, where Chinese-supplied air defence networks failed comprehensively against a coordinated US suppression-of-enemy-air-defence operation.
Satellite-based reporting showed that Indian strikes in May 2025 damaged at least six Pakistani airfields, including hangars, runways, mobile control buildings, and radar-related sites. Even Pakistan’s own military spokesperson acknowledged that Indian missiles had penetrated its defences and that five military bases and one civilian airport had been hit. That admission matters, despite Islamabad’s attempts to hide the full details of damage it faced during Operation Sindoor. While modern air defence networks do not need to intercept everything, they are expected to protect core military nodes from repeated, coordinated strikes. During Operation Sindoor, it failed to do so.
The HQ-9’s underperformance is particularly important because it was marketed as a high-end Chinese answer to Western and Russian long-range surface-to-air systems. In theory, such systems should complicate Indian air operations, protect strategic airbases, and force India to accept higher escalation costs.
In practice, Indian forces appear to have found and exploited gaps in Pakistan’s air defence architecture. If Indian standoff weapons and loitering munitions could hit radars, missile sites and airbases at Nur Khan, Rahim Yar Khan, Bholari, Shahbaz, and other locations, then it is clear that defence network did not deliver the operational denial Pakistan needed. This does not prove the HQ-9 is useless, but it does show that the export system, as deployed by Pakistan, was extremely vulnerable to electronic attack, suppression, poor integration, or weak operator readiness.
The JF-17 also emerged with a weaker reputation than Pakistan’s public messaging suggested. The aircraft was designed as an affordable multirole fighter for states that cannot buy Western platforms at scale. Its value proposition rests on low cost, Chinese weapons integration, and Pakistani operational experience. Operation Sindoor exposed the limits of that proposition.
Some reports indicated India had downed five Pakistani fighters of the F-16 and JF-17 class and one larger aircraft, mostly through the S-400 system. Obviously, Pakistan denied the claim. Still, the larger pattern is hard to ignore: Pakistan’s JF-17 force did not prevent Indian strikes on sensitive military sites, and Pakistan could not demonstrate comparable visible damage on Indian airbases after the early air battle. For a platform sold as the backbone of Pakistan’s affordable airpower, that is not a convincing battlefield result.
In the opening phase, several media reports falsely claimed that Pakistani J-10Cs and PL-15 missiles appeared to have achieved some tactical success against India. But even here, the lesson is mixed, and there is no conclusive evidence shared in the international media confirming the Pakistani side of the story. Whatever the case may be, more importantly, the J-10C’s alleged “tactical success” has not yet translated into broad export success.
The Pentagon’s 2025 China military report stated that, as of May 2025, Pakistan remained the only export customer for the J-10C, with 20 delivered out of 36 ordered. Several countries had expressed interest, but interest is not a sale. Pakistan has served as a reliable laboratory for testing Chinese equipment and facing the consequences of its failures.
This limited market response reflects deeper problems. Many states remain wary of buying major Chinese combat aircraft because such purchases carry geopolitical costs. U.S.-aligned or Western-equipped air forces worry about sanctions, interoperability, and intelligence exposure. Others worry about engine supply, long-term maintenance, spare parts, and upgrade pathways. Advanced fighter aircraft are judged over decades, not during air show demonstrations. The J-10C still lacked a long, independently verified combat record across multiple theaters. It is also tied to a logistics and weapons ecosystem that many states are reluctant to adopt fully. Potential buyers of JF-17 cannot make that shift towards Pakistan so easily.
The operation decisively undermined Pakistan’s “anti-stealth” narrative, which also had been central to Chinese defence export marketing strategies.
The broader pattern suggests that Pakistan’s military equipment faces persistent credibility gaps in international markets. Even when modern equipment like AESA radar has lost credible combat experience and often has a lower weapons payload than established competitors. Operation Sindoor, therefore, damaged more than individual systems. As a result, Pakistan had to rely on false narratives rather than the truth. It damaged Pakistan’s claim that its defence system is reliable and battle-ready.
Vishnu Nair is a distinguished strategic analyst specializing in the intersection of South Asian defense policy and emerging technological warfare
Note: The contents of the article are the sole responsibility of the author. Afghan Diaspora Network will not be responsible for any incorrect statements in the articles.
